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Double-Edged Protection 
I n  con tempora ry  Amer ican parlance, the word "protection" sounds two 
contrasting tones. One is comforting, the other ominous. With one tone, "protection11 
calls up images of the shelter against danger provided by a powerful friend, a large 
insurance policy, or a sturdy roof. With the other, i t  evokes the racket in which a 
local  strongman forces merchants to pay tribute in order to avoid damage, damage 
the strongman himself threatens to deliver. The difference, to be sure, is a matter 
of degree: a hell-anddamnation priest is only likely to collect contributions from his 
parishioners to  the extent that they believe his predictions of brimstone for infidels; 
the neighborhood mobster may actual ly be, as he claims to be, a brothel's best 
guarantee of operation free of police interference. 
Which image the word "protection" brings to  mind depends mainly on our 
assessment of the reality and externality of the threat. Someone who produces both 
the danger and, a t  a price, the shield against i t  is a racketeer. Someone who 
provides a needed shield but has l i t t le  control over the danger's appearance qualifies 
as a legitimate protector -- especially i f  his price is no higher than his competitors'. 
Someone who supplies reliable, low-priced shielding both f rom local  racketeers and 
from outside marauders makes the best offer of all. 
Apologists for particular governments and for government in general commonly 
argue, precisely, that they offer protection from local and external violence. They 
claim that the prices they charge barely cover the costs o f  protection. They ca l l  
people who complain about the price of protection "anarchists", "subversives", , ~ J o t h ,  
at once. But consider the definition of a racketeer as ,someone who creates a threat, 
then charges for i t s  reduction. Governments' provision of protection, by this 
standard, often qualifies as racketeering. To the extent that  the threats against 
which a given government protects its citizens are imaginary, or are consequences of 
i t s  own act iv i t ies,  the government has organized a protect ion racket.  Since 
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governments themselves commonly stimulate or even manufacture threats of external 
war, and since the repressive and ex t rac t ive  ac t iv i t ies  o f  governments o f t e n  
const i tute the largest current threats to the livelihoods of their own citizens, many 
governments operate in  essentially the same ways as racketeers. There is, of course, 
a difference: racketeers, by the conventional definition, operate without the authority 
of governments. 
How do racketeer-governments themselves acquire authority? As a question of 
fact and of ethics, that is one of the oldest conundrums of political analysis. Back 
to Machiavell i  and Hobbes, nevertheless, political observers have recognized that -- 
whatever else they do -- governments organize and, where possible, monopolize 
violence. I t  matters l i t t l e  whether we take violence in a narrow sense such as 
damage to persons and objects or i n  a broad sense such as v io lat ion o f  people's 
' 
desires and in teres ts ;  by ei ther c r i te r ion  governments stand out from other 
organ'izations by their tendency to monopolize the concentrated means o f  violence. 
The distinction .between "legitimate" and "illegitimate" force, furthermore, makes no 
difference to the fact. Indeed, Arthur Stinchcombe's agreeably cynical treatment of 
legitimacy as the probability that other authorities wi l l  act to confirm the decisions 
of a given authority underscores the importance of the authority's monopoly of force. 
A tendency to monopolize the means o f  violence makes a government's claim to 
provide protection, in either the comforting or the ominous sense of the word, more 
credible and harder to resist. 
Frank recognit ion of force's central place in governmental activity does not 
require us to believe that governmental authority rests "only" or "ultimately" on the , , 
threat of violence. Nor does i t  entai l  the assumption that a government's only ' 
service is protection. Even where the government's use o f  force imposes a large 
cost, some pcoplc may well decide that a government's other services outbalance the 
costs of acceding to its monopoly of violence. Recognition of the centrality of force 
opens thc way to an understanding of the growth and change of governmental forms. 
This essay concerns the place of organized means o f  violence i n  the growth 
and change of those peculiar forms of government we call national states: relatively 
' centralized, differentiated organizations whose o f f i c ia ls  more or less successfully 
c la im control  over the chief  concentrated means of violence within a population 
inhabiting a large, contiguous territory. The argument grows from historical work on 
the format ion of national states in western Europe, especially on the growth of the 
French state from 1600 onward. But i t  takes several deliberate steps away from that 
work, wheels, and stares hard at i t  from theoretical ground. The argument brings 
with i t  few illustrations, and no evidence worthy o f  the name. 
As one repacks a hast i ly- f i l led rucksack a f te r  a few .days on the trail - 
throwing out the waste, putting things in order of importance, and balancing the load 
-- I have repacked my theoretical baggage for the climb to come; the real test of 
the new packing only arrives with the next stretch of the trail. The trimmed-down 
argument stresses a) the interdependence o f  warmaking and statemaking, b) the 
analogy between both of those processes and what, when less successful and smaller 
in scale, we call organized crime. War makes states, I wil l  claim. Banditry, piracy, 
gangland rivalry, policing, and warmaking a l l  belong on the same continuum -- that I 
wi l l  claim as well. For the historically-limited period in which national states were 
becoming the dominant organizations in western countries, I wi l l  also c la im that  c )  
mercantile capitalism and statemaking reinforced each other. 
Here is a preview of the most general argument: Powerholders' pursuit of war 
involved them wi l ly-ni l ly  in  the extract ion o f  resources for warmaking from the 
populations over which they 'had control, and in  the promotion of capital accumulation 
by those who could help them borrow and buy. Warmaking, extraction, and capital 
accumulation interacted to  shape European statemaking. Powerholders did not 
l~ndertake those three momentous activities with the intention of creating national 
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~ states: centralized, differentiated, autonomous, extensive political organizations. Nor 
did they ordinarily foresee that nat ional  states would emerge f rom warmaking, 
extraction, and cap i ta l  accumulation. Instead, the people who controlled European 
states and states-in-the-making warred i n  order to  check or overcome t h e i r  
competitors, and thus to enjoy the advantages,of power within a secure or expanding 
territory. To make more effective war, they attempted to locate more capital. In 
the short run, they might acquire that capital by conquest, by 'selling o f f  their assets, 
by coercing or dispossessing accumulators o f  capital. I n  the long run, the quest 
inevitably involved them in establishing regular access to capitalists who could supply 
and arrange credit, and in imposing one form of regular taxation or another on the 
people and activities within their spheres of control. As the process continued, they 
developed a durable interest in  promoting the accumulation of capital, sometimes i n  
the guise o f  d i rec t  return to their own enterprises. Variations in the diff iculty of 
these activities - how hard i t  was to collect taxes, how expensive was the particular 
k ind o f  armed force adopted, how much warmaking i t  took to hold of f  competitors, 
and so on - caused the principal variants in the forms of European states. It a l l  
began wi th  the e f f o r t  to  monopolize the means o f  violence within a delimited 
territory adjacent to a powerholder's base. 
Violence and Government . 
What distinguished the violence produced by states from the violence delivered 
by anyone else? In the long run, enough to make the division between "legitimate" 
and " i l legi t imate" force credible. Eventually, the personnel of states purveyed 
violence on a larger scale, more effectively, more efficiently, with wider assent from 
their  subject populations, and with readier collaboration from neighboring authorities 
than did the personnel of other organizations. But that series of distinctions- took a 
long t ime to  establish. Early in the statemaking process, many parties shared the 
right to use violence, the practice of using i t  routinely to accomplish their ends, or 
bo th  a t  once. The continuum ran f rom bandits and pirates to  kings via tax 
collectors, regional powerholders, and professional soldiers. ' . 
The uncertain, e last ic l ine between "legitimate" and "illegitimate" violence 
appeared in .the upper reaches of power. Early i n  the statemaking process, many 
parties shared the right to use violence, its actual employment, or both at once. The 
long love-hate affair between aspiring statemakers and pirates or bandits i l lustrates 
the division. "Behind, piracy on the seas acted cities and city-states," writes Fernand 
Braudel of the sixteenth century. "Behind 'banditry, that terrestrial piracy, appeared 
the continual aid of lords . . . " (Braudel 1966, 11: 88-89). In times of war, indeed, 
the managers'of full-fledged states often commissioned privateers, hired sometime 
bandits to raid their enemies, and encouraged their regular troops to take booty. In 
royal service, soldiers and sailors were often expected to provide for themselves by 
preying on the c iv i l ian  population: commandeering, raping, looting, taking prizes. 
When demobilized, they commonly continued the same practices, but without the same 
royal protection;. demobilized ships became pirate vessels, demobilized troops bandits. 
It also worked the other way: a king's best source of armed supporters was sometimes 
the world of outlaws. Robin Hood's conversion to royal archer may be a myth, but 
the myth records a practice. The distinctions between "legitimate" and "illegitimate" 
users o f  violence only came clear very slowly, in the process of making the state's 
armed forces relatively unified and permanent. 
Up to  that point, as Braudel says, mari t ime c i t ies  and ter res t r ia l  lords 
commonly offered protection, or even sponsorship, to freebooters. Many lords who 
did not pretend to be kings, furthermore, successfully claimed the right to levy troops 
and maintain their own armed retainers. Without calling on some of those lords to 
br ing their  armies wi th them, no king could fight a war. Yet those same armed 
lords constituted the king's rivals and opponents, his enemies' potent ia l  allies. For 
that  reason, before the seventeenth century, regencies for child-sovereigns reliably 
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I produced c i v i l  wars. For the same reason, disarming the great stood high on the 
1 agenda of every would-be statemaker. 
The Tudors, for example, accomplished that agenda through most of England. 
"The greatest. triumph of the Tudors," writes Lawrence Stone, 
was the ul t imately successful assertion of a royal monopoly of violence both 
public and private, an achievement which profoundly al tered not ohly the 
nature of politics but also the quality of daily life. There occurred a chaqge 
in English habits that can only be compared with the further step taken in  the 
nineteenth'century, when the growth of a police force finally consolidated the 
monopoly and made i t  effective in  the greatest cities and the smallest villages 
' . (Stone 1965: 200). 
The Tudor demilitarizatior! of ttie great lords entailed four complementary campaigns: 
eliminating their great personal bands of armed retainers, razing their  fortresses, 
t am ing  t h e i r  hab i tua l  resort t o  violence for the settlement o f  disputes, and 
discouraging the cooperation.of their dependents and tenants. I n  the Marches o f  
England and Scotland, the task was more delicate, for the Percys and Dacres who 
kept armies and castles along the border threatened the crown, but also provided a 
buffer against Scottish invaders. But they, too, eventually fel l  into line. 
I n  France, Richelieu began the great 'd isarmament i n  the 1620s. W i th  
Richelieu's advice, Louis Xll l  systematically ordered the destruction of the castles of 
the great rebel lords, Protestant and Catholic, against whom his forces batt led 
incessantly. He began to condemn duelling, the carrying of lethal weapons, and the 
maintenance of private armies. By the later 162Os, Richelieu was declaring the royal 
monopoly o f  force as doctrine. The doctrine took another half-century to beco'me 
effective: 
Once more the conflicts of the Fronde had wi,&essed armies assembled by the 
'grandst. Only the last of the regencies, the one after the death of Louis XIV, 
did not lead to armed uprisings. By that time Richelieu's principle had become 
a reality. Likewise i n  the Empire a f t e r  the Th i r ty  Years' War only the 
territorial princes had the right of levying troops and of maintaining fortresses .. . . Everywhere the razing of castles, the high cost of artillery, the attraction 
of court  l i fe,  and the ensuing domestication of the nobility had its share in 
this development (Cerhard 1981: 124-125). 
By the later eighteenth century, through most o f  Europe monarchs disposed of 
~ermanent, professional military forces which rivaled those of their neighbors and far 
exceeded any other organized armed force within their own territories. The state's 
monopoly of 'large-scale violence was turning from theory to reality. 
The elimination of local rivals, however, posed a serious problem. Beyond the 
scale of a small city-state, no monarch could govern a population w i th  his armed 
force alone, and no monarch could afford to create a professional staff large and 
strong enough to reach from him to the ordinary citizen. Before quite recently, no 
European government approached the completeness of articulation from top to bottom 
achieved by imperial China. Even the Roman Empire did not come close. In one 
way or another, every European government before the French Revolution relied on 
indirect rule via local ,magnates. The magnates collaborated wi th  the government 
without becoming officials in any strong sense of the term, disposed to some extent 
'of government-backed force, and exercised wide discret ion w i t h i n  t h e i r  own  
terr i tor ies:  Junkers, Justices o f  the Peace, lords. Yet those same magnates were 
potential rivals, possible allies of a rebellious people. 
Eventually, European governments reduced their reliance on indirect rule by 
means of two expensive but effective strategies: 1) extending their officialdom down 
, to  the local  community, and 2) encouraging the creation of police forces that were 
subordinate to the 'government rather than to  individual patrons, dist inct  f rom 
warmaking forces, and therefore less useful as the tools of dissident magnates. But 
in  between the builders of national power a l l  played a mixed strategy: eliminating, 
subjugat ing,  dividing, conquering, cajoling, buying as the occasions presented 
themselves. The buying manifested itself in exemptions from taxation, creations o f  
honorific offices, the establishment of claims on the national treasury, and a variety 
of other devices that made a magnate's welfare depend on the maintenance o f  the 
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ex i s t i ng  s t r u c t u r e  o f  power. In the long run, it a l l  came down to  massive 
pacification, and monopolization of the means of coercion. 
Protection as Business 
In retrospect, the pacification, cooptation, or elimination of fractious rivals to 
the sovereign seems an awesome; noble, prescient enterprise, destined to bring peace 
to a people. Yet i t  followed almost ineluctably from the logic of expanding power. 
I f  a' powerholder' was to gain from the provision of protection, those competitors had 
t o  yield. As economic historian Frederic Lane put i t  twenty-f ive years ago, 
governments are in  the business of selling protection . . . whether people want it or 
not. Lane argued that the very activity of producing and controlling violence favored 
monopoly, since competition wi th in tha t  realm generally raised costs, instead o f  
lowering them. The production of violence, he suggested, enjoyed large economies of 
scale. Working from there, he distinguished between a) the monopoly pro f i t ,  or 
tribute, coming to  owners of the means of production of violence as a result of the 
difference between production costs and the price exacted from "customers", and b) 
the protect ion rent accruing to those customers - for example, merchants - who 
drew effective protection against outside competitors. Lane, a superbly, a t ten t ive  
historian of Venice, allowed specifically for the case of a government that generates 
protection rents for its merchants by deliberately at tacking their  competitors. I n  
their adaptation of Lane's scheme, furthermore, Ames and Rapp (1977) substitute the 
apt word "extortion" for Lane's "tribute". In this model, predation, coercion, piracy, 
banditry, and racketeering share a home wi th  their upright cousins in responsible 
government. 
Here is how Lane's rnodel worked: I f  a prince could create sufficient armed 
force to hold of f  his and his subjects' external enemies and to keep the subjects in 
line for 50 megapwnds, but was able to  extract 75 megapounds in taxes from those 
subjects for that purpose, he gained a tribute of (75 - 50 = ) 25 megapounds. But i f  
the 10-~ound share of those taxes paid by one of the prince's merchant-subjects gave 
him assured access to world markets at  less than the 15-pound shares paid to  their 
princes by the merchant's foreign competitors, the merchant also gained a protection 
rent of ( I5 : 10 = ) 5 pounds by virtue o f  his prince's greater ef f ic iency.  That 
reasoning differs only in degree and in scale .from the reasoning of violence-wielding 
criminals and their clients. Labor racketeering (in which, for example, a ship-owner 
holds of f  trouble from longshoremen by means of a timely payment to the local union 
boss) works on exactly the same principle: the union boss gets t r ibute for  his no- 
str ike pressure on the longshoremen, while the shipowner avoids the strikes and 
slowdowns longshoremen impose on his competitors. 
Lane pointed out what different behavior we might expect of the managers of 
a protection-providing government owned by: 
I. citizens in  general; 
2. a single self-interested, monarch; 
3. the managers themselves. 
I f  cit izens in  'general exercised effective ownership of the government -- o distant 
ideal! - we might expect the managers to minimize protection costs and tribute, thus 
maximizing protect ion rent. A single self-interested monarch, in contrast, would 
maximize tribute, set costs so as to accomplish that maximization of tribute, and act 
indifferent to the level of 'protection rent. I f  the managers owned the government, 
they would tend to keep costs high by maximizing their  own wages, to maximize 
tribute over and above those costs by exacting a high price from their subjects, and 
likewise act indifferent to the level of protection rent., The first model approximates 
a Jeffersonian democracy,. the second a petty despotism, the third a military junta. 
Lane did not discuss the obvious fourth category of owner, a dominant class. 
I f  he had, his scheme would have yielded interesting empirical criteria for evaluating 
claims that 'a given government was "relatively autonomous" or strictly subordinate to 
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a dominant class's interests. Presumably a subordinate government would tend to 
maxirnke monopoly p ro f i t s  -- returns' to the dominant c lass'resul t ing f rom the 
' difference between the costs of protection and the price received for i t  -- as well as 
protection rents tuned nicely to the economic interests o f  the dominant class. An 
autonornous government, in contrast, would tend to maximize manager's wages and. its 
own size as well, and would act indi f ferent t o  protect ion rents. Lane's analysis 
immediately suggests fresh propositions, and ways of testing them. 
Lane also speculated that the logic of the situation produced four successive 
stages within the general history of capitalism: 
I. a period of anarchy and plunder; 
2. a itage in which tribute-takers were attracting customers and establishing 
their' monopolies by struggling to create exclusive, substantial states; 
3. a stage i n  which merchants and landlords began to  gain more f rom 
protection rents than governors did from tribute; 
4. a period -- fa i r l y  recent -- i n  which technological.changes surpassed 
protection rents as sources of profit for entrepreneurs. 
Wanting to  contain his analysis neatly within the neoclassical theory of industrial 
organization, Lane cramped his treatment o f  protection: t reat ing a l l  taxpayers as 
"customers" for  the "service" provided by protection-manufacturing governments, 
brushing aside the objections to the idea o f  a forced sale by insisting tha t  the 
"customer" always had the choice of not paying and taking the consequences of 
nonpayment, minimizing the problems o f  d iv is ib i l i ty  created by the public-goods 
character of protection, and deliberately neglecting the distinction between the costs 
of producing the means of violence in  general and the costs o f  giving "customers" 
protection by means of that violence. Lane's ideas ,s"ffocate inside the neoclassical 
box, and breathe easily outside it. Nevertheless, inside or. outside they properly draw 
the economic analysis of government back to the chief activities real governments 
have carried on historically: war, repression, protection, adjudication. 
More recently, Richard Bean has applied a similar logic to the rise of European 
national states between 1400 and 1600. He appeals to  economies o f  scale i n  the 
production of effective force, counteracted by diseconomies of scale in command and 
control. He,then claims that the improvement of artillery in  the f i f teenth  century 
(as cannon made small Medieval forts much .more vulnerable to an organized force) 
shifted the curve o f  economies and diseconomies to  make larger armies, standing 
armies, and centralized governments advantageous to their masters. Hence, according 
to Bean, military innovation promoted the creation of large, expensive, well-armed 
national states. 
History Talks 
Bean's summary does not stand up to  histor ical  scrutiny. As a matter of 
practice, the shift to infantry-backed artillery sieges of fort i f ied cities only occurred 
during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. That was too late to have the 
, . 
increase in the viable size of states. Nor is i t  obvious that changes in  land war had 
the sweeping influence Bean attributes to them. The increasing decisiveness of naval 
warfare, which occurred simultaneously, could wel l  have shi f ted the  m i l i t a r y  
advantage to smal l  mar i t ime powers such as the Dutch Republic. Although many 
city-states and other microscopic entities disappeared into larger political units before 
1600, furthermore, such events as the fractionation of the Habsburg empire and such 
facts as the persistence of large but loosely-knit Poland and Russia render ambiguous 
the c la im o f  a signif icant increase i n  geographical scale. In short, both Bean's 
prbposed explanation and his statement of what must be explained raise histor ical  
doubts. 
Stripped of i ts tecllnological determinism, nevertheless, Bean's logic provides a 
useful complement to Lane's. For varying mi l i ta ry  formats do cost substantial ly 
different amounts to produce, and do providc substantially different ranges of control 
over opponents, domestic and foreign. After 1400 the European pursuit o f  larger, 
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more permanent, and more costly varieties of military organization did, in fact, drive 
spectacular increases in princely budgets, taxes, and staffs. After I500 or so, princes 
who managed to  create the costly varieties of military organization were, indeed, 
able to conquer new ,chunks of territory. 
The word "territory" should not mislead us. Until the eighteenth century, the 
greatest powers were mari t ime states, and naval warfare remained cruc ia l  t o  
internat ional  position. Consider Fernand Braudel's roll-call of successive hegemonic 
powers within the capitalist world: Venice and i t s  empire, Genoa and i t s  empire, 
AntwerplSpain, Amsterdam/Holland, LondonlEngland, New Yorklthe United States. 
Although ~rar idenbur~-~russ ia  offers a partial exception, only i n  our own t ime have 
such essentially landbound states as Russia and China achieved preponderant positions 
in the world's system of states. Naval warfare was by no means the only reason for 
that bias toward the sea. Before the later nineteenth century, land transportation 
was so expensive everywhere in  Europe that no country could afford to supply a large 
army or a big c i ty with grain and other heavy goods without having efficient water 
transport. Rulers only fed major inland centers such as Berlin and Madrid at  great 
e f fo r t ,  and at  considerable cost to their hinterlands. The exceptional efficiency of 
waterways in  the Netherlands undoubtedly gave the Dutch great advantages at  peace 
and at war (see de Vries 1978). 
Access to water mattered in  another important way. Those metropolises in  
Braudel's list were al l  major ports, great centers o f  commerce, and outstanding 
mobilizers o f  capital. Both the trade and the cap i ta l  served the purposes of 
ambitious rulers. By a circuitous route, tha t  observation brings us back to  the 
arguments o f  Lane and '.Bean. Considering that both of them wrote as economic 
historians, the greatest weakness in the LanelBean analysis comes as a surprise: both 
of them understate the importance of capital accumulation to military expansion. As 
Jan de Vries says of the period after 1600: 
Frencll Royal' Revenues and Expenditure:;. 151.5-1785, 
i n  Tons of Fine S i l v e r .  
Source: Cu6ry 1978: 227 
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Looking back, one cannot help but be struck by the seemingly symbiotic 
relationship existing between the state, mi l i ta ry  power, and the pr iva te  
economy's efficiency in the age of absolutism. Behind every successful dynasty 
stood an array of opulent banking families. Access to  such bourgeois resources 
proved crucial to the princes' state-building and centralizing policies. Princes 
also needed direct access to agricultural resources, which could be mobil ized 
only when agr icul tural  productivity grew & an effective administrative and 
mil i tary power existed to  enforce the princes' claims. But the lines o f  
causation also ran in  the opposite direction. Successful state-building and 
. empire-building activities plus the associated tendency toward concentration of 
urban population and government expenditure, offered the private economy 
unique and invaluable opportunit ies to  capture economies o f  scale. These 
economies o f  scale occasionally affected industrial production but were most 
significant in the development of trade and finance. In addition, the sheer 
pressure o f  cent ra l  government taxation did as much as any other economic 
force to channel peasant production into the market and thereby augment the 
opportunit ies for trade creat ion and economic specialization (de Vries 1976: 
242-243). 
Nor does the "symbiotic relationship" hold only for the period after 1600. For the 
precocious .case of France, Figure I shows the increase o f  royal  expenditures and 
revenues , f rom 1515 to  1785. Although the rates o f  growth i n  both regards 
accelerated appropriately. after 1600, they also rose substantially during the sixteenth 
century. After 1550, the internal Wars of Religion checked the work of international 
expansion Francis I began earlier in the century, but f rom the 1620s onward Louis 
X l l l  and XIV (aided and abetted, to be sure, by Richelieu, Mazarin, Colbert and other 
statemaking wizards) resumed the task with a vengeance. "As always," comments 
V.G. Kiernan, "war had every political recotnmendation and every financial drawback" 
(Kiernan 1980: 104). 
Borrowing, then paying interest on the debt, accounts for much of the 
discrepancy between the two curves. Great capitalists played crucial parts on both 
sides of the transaction: as the principal sources of royal credit, especially in  the 
short term; and as the most important contractors in '.the risky but lucrative business 
of collecting royal taxes. 
For this reason, i t  is worth noticing that: 
For prac t ica l  purposes the national debt began in  the reign of Francis I. 
Following the loss of Milan, the key to northern Italy, on September 15, 1522, 
Francis I borrowed 200,000 francs . . .. at 12.5 percent from the merchants of 
Paris, to intensify the war against Charles V. Administered by the c i t y  
government, this loan inaugurated the famous series of bonds based on revenues 
from the capital and known as rentes sur 1'Hotel de Ville (Hamilton 1950: 246). 
(The government's failure to pay those rentes, incidentally, helped aligned the Parisian 
bourgeoisie against the Crown during the Fronde, sorne twelve decades later.) By 
1595, the nat ional  debt had risen to  300 ,mi l l ion francs; despite governmental 
bankruptcies, currency manipulations, and the monumental r ise i n  taxes, by Louis 
XIV's death i n .  1715 war-induced borrowing had inflated the total to about 3 billion 
francs, the equivalent of about eighteen years in royal revenues (liarnilton 1950: 247, 
249). War, state apparatus, taxation, and borrowing advanced in tight cadence. . 
Although France was precocious, she was by no means alone. "Even more than 
in  the case of France," reports the ever-useful Earl J. Hamilton: 
the national debt of England originated and has grown during major wars. 
Except for an insignificant carry-over from the Stuarts, the debt began in 1689 
with the reign of William and Mary. In the words of Adam Smith, "it was in 
, the war which began in 1688, and was concluded by the treaty of Ryswick in 
1697, that the foundation of the present enormous debt of Great Br i ta in  was 
first laid" (Hamilton 1950: 254). 
Hamilton, i t  is true,, goes on t o  quote the mercant i l is t  Charles Davenant, who 
complained in 1698 that the high interest rates promoted by government borrowing 
were cramping English trade. Davenant's complaint suggests, however, that England 
was already entering Frederic Lane's th i rd  stage o f  state-capi ta l  relations, when 
merchants and landowners get more of the surplus than do the suppliers of protection. 
Un t i l  the sixteenth century, the English expected their kings t o  l ive on 
revenues from their own property, and to levy taxes only for war. G.R. Elton marks 
the great innovation at Thomas Cromwell's drafting of Henry Vlll's subsidy bi l ls  for  
1534 and 1540: " . . . 1540 was very careful to cont,inue the real innovation of 1534, 
namely that extraordinary contributions could be levied for reasons other than war" 
(Elton 1975: 42). After that point as before, however, warrnaking provided the main 
stimulus to increases in the level of taxation as well as of debt. Rarely did debt 
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and taxes recede. What Peacock and wiseman call a "displacement effectl"(and 
others sometimes ca l l  a "ratchet ef fect")  occurred: when public revenues and 
expenditures rose abruptly during war, they set a new, higher floor beneath which 
' peacetime revenues and expenditures did not sink (Peacock and Wiseman 1961). 
During the Napoleonic Wars, Rrit ish taxes ,rose from 15 to 24 percent of national 
income, and to almost three times the French level of taxation (Mathias 1975: 122). 
True, Britain had the double advantage of relying less on expensive land forces 
than her continental rivals and of drawing more of her tax revenues f rom customs 
and excise -- taxes which were, despite evasion, significantly cheaper to collect than 
land-, property-, and poll-taxes. Nevertheless, in England as well as elsewhere debt 
and taxes both rose enormously from the seventeenth century on. They rose mainly as 
a function of the increasing cost of warmaking. 
What Do States Do? 
As should now be clear, Lane's analysis of protection fails to distinguish among 
several different. uses of state-controlled violence. Under the general heading o f  
organized violence, the agents of states characteristically carry on four different 
activities: 
1 .  WARMAKING: el iminat ing or neutralizing their  own rivals outside the 
territories in which they have clear and continuous pr io r i ty  as wielders o f  
force; 
2. STATEMAKING: el iminat ing or neutral iz ing their  r ivals inside those 
territories; 
3. PROTECTION: eliminating or neutralizing the enemies of their clients; 
4. EXTRACTION: acquiring the means of carrying out t he  f i r s t  t h ree  
activities: warmaking, statemaking, and protection. 
The third item correspond; to protection as analyzed by Lane. But the other three 
also involve the application o f  force. They overlap inconipletely, and to varying 
degrees; for example, warmaking against the con~merc ia l  r i v a l s  o f  the  l o c a l  
bourgeoisie delivers protection to that bourgeoisie. To the extent that a population 
divides into enemy classes and the state extends its favors partially to one class or 
another, statemaking actually reduces the protection given some classes. 
Warmaking, statemaking, protection, and extract ion each take a number o f  
d i f fe rent  forms. Extraction, for  instance, ranges f rom outright plunder through 
regular tribute to  bureaucratized taxation. Yet a l l  four depend on the state's 
tendency to monopolize the concentrated means of coercion. From the perspectives 
of those who dominate the state, each of  them -- i f  carr ied on e f fec t ive ly  -- 
generally reinforces the others. Thus a state which successfully eradicates its 
internal rivals strengthens i t s  ab i l i t y  to  ex t rac t  resources, to wage war, and to  
protect  i t s  chief  supporters. In the earlier European experience, broadly speaking, 
those supporters were typical ly landlords, armed retainers o f  the monarch. and 
churchmen. 
Each o f  the major uses of violence produced its own characteristic forms of 
organization. Warmaking yielded armies, navies, and supporting services. Staternaking 
produced durable instruments o f  surveillance and cont ro l  wi th in the te r r i to ry .  
Protection relied on the organization of warmaking and statemaking, but added to i t  
an apparatus by which the protected called forth the protection that was their due -- 
notably through courts and representative assemblies. Extraction brought the f iscal  
and accounting structures into being. The organization and deployment of .violence 
' 
itself accounts for much of the characteristic structure of European states. 
The general ru le seems to  have operated l ike this: the more costly the 
activity, a l l  other things equal, the greater the organizational residue. To the extent, 
for example, that a given government invested in'large standing armies -- a very 
costly, i f  effective, means of warmaking -- the bureaucracy created to service the 
army was l ikely to  become bulky. Furthermore, a government building a standing 
army but control l ing a small population was l ikely to  incur greater costs, and 
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therefore to buiild a bulkier structure, than a government within a populous country. 
Brandenburg-Prussia was the classic case of high cost for the available resources; the 
Prussian e f f o r t  t o  build an army matching.those of i ts larger continental neighbors 
' created an immense structure; i t  mil i tarized and bureaucratized much o f  German 
social life. 
When i t  comes to extraction, the smaller the pool of resources and the less 
commercialized the economy, other things being equal, the more diff icult the work of 
extracting resources to  sustain war and other governmental activities, hence the more 
extensive the fiscal apparatus. England illustrated the corollary of that proposition, 
with a relatively large and commercialized pool of resources drawn on by a relatively 
small fiscal apparatus. As Gabriel Ardant has argued, the choice of f iscal  strategy 
probably made an additional difference. On the whole, taxes on land were expensive 
to collect as compared with taxes on trade, especially large flows o f  trade past 
easily-controlled checkpoints: Denmark's position astride the entrance to the Baltic 
gave her an extraordinary opportunity to profit from customs revenues. 
With respect to statemaking (in the narrow sense of eliminating or neutralizing 
the local rivals of the people who controlled the state), a te r r i to ry  populated by 
great landlords or by dist inct  religious groups generally imposed larger costs on a 
conqueror than one o f  fragmented power or homogeneous cu l t u re ;  t h i s  t i m e  
fragmented and homogeneous Sweden, with i ts relatively small but effective apparatus 
of control, may illustrate the corollary. Finally, the cost of protection (in the sense 
of  el iminating or neutralizing the enemies of the statemakers' clients) mounted with 
the range over which that protect ion extended; Portugal's e f f o r t  t o  bar the  
~ e d i t & r a n e a n  to i t s  merchants' competitors in  the spi,ce trade provides a textbook 
case of an unsuccessful protect ion e f f o r t  which nonetheless bui l t  up a massive 
structure. Thus the sheer size of the government varied directly with the effort 
devoted to extraction, statemaking, protect ion and, especially, warmaking, but 
inversely with the commercialization of the economy and the extent of the resource 
base. What is more, the relative bulk of different features of the government varied 
w i th  the cost-resource ratios of extraction, staternaking, protection and warmaking. 
In Spain we see hypertrophy of Court and courts as the outcome of  centuries o f  
effort at subduing internal enemies, while in Holland we are amazed to see how small 
a fiscal apparatus grows up with high taxes within a rich, commercialized economy. 
C l e a r l y ,  warmaking, e x t r a c t i o n ,  s ta temak ing,  and p r o t e c t i o n  were  
interdependent. Speaking very, very generally, the classic European statemaking 
experience followed this causal pattern: 
WARMAKING- EXTRACTION 
1 x 1  
PROTECTION <--STATEMAKING 
In  an idealized'sequence, a great lord made war so e f fec t ive ly  as t o  become 
dominant in a 'substantial territory. But that warmaking led to increased extraction 
of the means of war - men, arms, food, lodging, transportation, supplies, and/or the 
money to buy them -- from the population within that territory. The building up of 
warmaking capacity likewise increased the capacity to  extract. The very activity of 
extraction, i f  successful, entailed the elimination, neutralization, or cooptation of the 
great lord's local rivals; thus i t  led, to staternaking. As a by-product, i t  created 
organization in the form of tax-collection agencies, police forces, courts, exchequeurs, 
account-keepers; thus i t  led to staternaking. To a lesser extent, warmaking likewise 
caused statemaking through the expansion of military organization itself, as a standing 
army, war industries, supportirig bureaucracies and (rather later)  schools grew up 
within the state apparatus. A l l  of these structures checked potential rivals and 
opponents. In the course of making war, extracting resources, and building up the 
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state apparatus, the managers of states formed alliances with specific social classes. 
The members of those classes loaned resources, provided technical services, or helped 
assure the compliance of the rest of the population, a l l  in return for a measure of 
protection against their own r ivals and enemies. As a result o f  these mult ip le 
strategic choices, a distinctive state apparatus grew up within each major section of 
Europe. 
This s impl i f ied model, however, neglects the external relations which shaped 
every national state. Early in  the process, the dist inct ion between "internal" and 
"external" remained as unclear as the distinction between state power and the power 
accruing to lords allied with the state. Later, three interlocking influences connected 
any given national state to the European network of states. First, there were the 
flows of resources in the form of loans and ;upplies, especially loans and supplies 
devoted t o  warmaking. Second, there was the compet i t ion among states for  
Iiege~nony in disputed territories, which stimulated warmaking and temporarily erased 
the distinctions among warmaking, statemaking,,and extraction. Third, there was the 
intermittent creation of coalitions of states which temporarily combined their efforts 
t o  force a given state into a certain fo rm and position within the international 
network. The warmaking coalition is one example, but the peacemaking coal i t ion 
played an even more crucial part: from 1648, i f  not before, at the ends of wars we 
find a l l  effective European states coalescing temporarily to bargain out the boundaries 
and rulers of the recent belligerents. From that point on, the major reorganizations 
of the European state system came in spurts, at the settlements of widespread wars. 
From each large war, in general, emerged fewer national states than had entered it. 
In these circu~oistdnces, war became the normal condition of the internat ional  
system of states, and the normal means of defending or enhancing a position within 
the system. Why war? No simple answer wil l  do; war as a potent means served 
Inore than one end. But surely part  o f  the answer goes back t o  the central  
mechanisms o f  statemaking: the very logic by which a local  lord extended or 
defended the perimeter within which he monopolized the means o f  violence, and 
thereby increased his return from tribute, continued on a larger scale into the logic 
of war. Early in  the process, external and internal  r ivals overlapped t o  a large 
degree. Only the establishment of large perimeters of control within which great 
lords had checked their r ivals sharpened the l ine between internal  and external. 
George Modelski 'sums up the competitive logic cogently: 
Global . . . strengthened those states that attained i t  re lat ively to  a l l  
other political and other organizations. What is more, other states competing 
in  the global power game developed similar organizational forms and simi lar  
hardiness: they too became nation-states -- in a defensive reaction, because 
forced to take issue with or to confront a global power, as France confronted 
Spain and later Britain, or in  imitation of i ts obvious success and effectiveness, 
as Germany followed the example o f  Br i ta in  in to  Weltmacht, or as ear l ier  
Peter' the Great had rebuilt Russia on Dutch precepts and examples. Thus not 
only Portugal, the Netherlands, Britain and the United States became nat ion- 
states, but also Spain, France, Germany, Russia and Japan. The short, and the 
most parsimonious, answer to the question of why these succeeded where 'most 
. of the European efforts to build states failed' is that they were either global 
powers or successfully fought with or against them (Modelski 1978: 231). 
This logic o f  international statemaking acts out on a large scale the logic of local 
aggrandizement. The external complemented the internal. 
I f  we a l l ow  t h a t  f r a g i l e  dist inct ion between "internal" and "external" 
statemalting processes, then we might schematize European statemaking's history as 
three stages: 1) the differential success of some powerholders in "external" struggles 
establishes the difference.between an "internal" and an "external" arena for  the 
deployment of force; 2) "external" competition generates "internal" statemaking; 3) 
"external" compacts among states influence the form and locus of part icular states 
ever more powerfully. In this perspective, state-certifying organizations such as the 
League of Nations and the. United Nations simply extended the European-based process 
t o  the wo r ld  as a whole. Whether forced or voluntary, bloody or peaceful, 
decolonization simply completed that process by which existing states leagued to 
create new ones. 
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The extension of the Europe-based 'statemaking process to the rest of the 
world, however, did not create states in the strict European image. Broadly speaking, 
internal struggles such as the checking of great regional lords and the imposition of 
taxation on peasant villages produced important organizational features o f  European 
states: the relative subordination of military power to civilian control, the extensive 
bureaucracy of fiscal surveillance, the representation of wronged interests via petition 
and parliament; On the whole, states elsewhere developed differently. The most 
telling feature of that difference appears in military organization. European states 
bu i l t  up their  mi l i ta ry  apparatuses through sustained struggles with their subject 
populations, ahd by means of selective extension of protect ion .to d i f fe rent  classes 
within those populations. The agreements on protect ion constrained the rulers 
themselves, making them vulnerable to courts, to assemblies, to withdrawals of credit, 
services, and expertise. 
To a la rger  degree, states that  have come into being recent ly through 
decolonization or through reallocations of te r r i to ry  by the dominant states have 
acquired their military organization from outside, without the same internal forging of 
mutual constraints between rulers and ruled. To the extent tha t  outside states 
continue to supply military goods and expertise in return for commodities, or military 
alliance, or both, the new states harbor powerful, unconstrained organizations which 
casily overshadow all other organizations within their territories. To the extent that 
outside states guarantee their boundaries, the managers of those military organizations 
cxercisc extraordinary power within them. The advantages of military power become 
enormous, the incentives to seize power over the state as a whole by means of that 
advantage very strong. . Despite the great place that warrnaking occupied in the 
making of European states, the old national s ta tes  o f  E'urope a lmost  never 
experienced the great disproportion between military organization and al l  other forms 
of organization that seems tlie fate of c l ient  st$tes throughout the contemporary 
world. 
In our own time, not a l l  states entering the Europe-based system of states 
have been clients, and not a l l  have been equally vulnerable to military control. As a 
f i r s t  a t t e m p t  t o  reason f rom possible lessons o f  the European experience to  
alternative paths through the contemporary world, let me propose a simple fourfold 
classif ication. As usual, the four categories result from arbitrarily cutting each of 
two continua in  half; the continua are a) the extent to  which a state's mi4itary 
organization is created, trained, and supplied by other states: internal vs. external; b) 
the extent to which the resources to support mi l i ta ry  organization are generated 
d i rec t ly  by the export o f  labor or commodities to other countries: deperidcrit vs. 
independent. 
DEPENDENCE ON EXPORTS 
FOR MILITARY RESOURCES 
DEPENDENT 
SOURCE 
EXTERNAL client states e.g. 
OF Honduras 
MILITARY 







e.g. China, South 
Africa 
I f  we take European experience seriously, we should expect c l ien t  states to  fo l low 
signals f rom their patrons, clones to  be especially vulnerable to military coups, 
merchants to wax and wane as a function of tlie world market for their commodities 
or labor, and autonomous states to occupy similar positions to the old members of 
the European state-system. 
In the light of European experience, merchants -- especially, in our own time, 
exporters of o i l  -- pose some especially interesting questions. Their s i tuat ion most 
resembles that of Spain when riches were flowing in from America. On the one 
hand, when demand for their exports is high, they avoid much of the statemaking 
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effort, and the consequent fighting out of agreements with major classes within their 
own territories, that so marked European preparation for  war, That side o f  the 
equation suggests the possibil i ty o f  an acquiescent population, and a relatively 
peaceful exercise of power by those who control the essential commodities. On the 
other, their mi l i ta ry  organizations acquire. a fearsome power relat ive t o  other 
organizations in their vicinities. Where i t  is technically possible for the same small 
group to seize cdntrol of the military apparatus and the sources of exports, we should 
witness an incentive to military coups which wil l  outshadow the petty maneuvers o f  
the clones. Perhaps only the Shah's preference for the position of client to that of 
merchant saved Iran from being the first great example. 
A Farewell Warning 
on which 
Remember how thin is the tissue of evidence/all this speculation I'ies. 1 have 
schematized the European experience of warmaking and statemaking, withou't taking 
account of a l l  the other factors affecting variations in the fates of national states: 
language, religion, geopolit ical position, access to trade routes. Then I have 
heedlessly extended the scheme outside o f  Europe, without any of the historical 
qualifications and recalibrations i t  requires. Consider it history in the As If, history 
as mater ia l  for theoretical reflection, history as a source of hypotheses which must 
return, for refinement, rectification, and verification, to the actual experience f rom 
which i t  came. If summarizing European warmaking and statemaking is like skating 
on thin ice, extrapolating that summary to the contemporary world resembles walking 
on water. Send out the life-preservers! 
NOTE. This is a rough-but-not-ready draft of a paper for a conference on States and 
Social Structures: Research Implications of Current Theories, sponsored by the Social 
Science Research Counci1,and held in Mt. Kisco, New York, 25-27 February 1982. 
More than usual, I would appreciate advice, not to mention caution in  quoting the 
paper. I am grateful to Dawn Hendricks for assistance with bibliography, and to the 
Nat~onal Science Foundation for financial support. 
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